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Public Good Games with Incentives:
the role of reputation
Hannelore De Silva and Karl Sigmund
Abstract
Both the Trust Game and the Ultimatum Game reduce, in their most
simplified versions, to a Public Good Game with an added incentive: namely
a reward in the first case, and a sanction in the other. In this paper, the
evolutionary game dynamics of these games is analyzed by means of the
replicator equation. Positive and negative incentives have very different but
complementary effects. We investigate the role of reputation, and show how
occasional failures to contribute can lead to stabilizing cooperation.
1 A philosophical entente cordiale
In Leviathan (1651), the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes described life
in the absence of a central authority as ’solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and
short’. Selfish urges lead to ’such a war as is every man against every man.’
The contemporary French philosopher Blaise Pascal held an equally dim
view: ’Nous naissons injustes; car chacun tend a` soi...La pente vers soi est
le commencement de tout desordre en guerre, en police, en economie etc.’
(We are born unfair; for everyone inclines towards himself...The tendency
towards oneself is the origin of every disorder in war, polity, economy etc.)
In the following century, views on selfishness underwent a remarkable
turn-about. The Scottish philosopher Adam Smith held that the selfish per-
son works inadvertently for the public benefit. ’By pursuing his own inter-
est he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when
he really intends to promote it.’ Greed promotes behavior beneficial to oth-
ers. And most famously: ’It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard
to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages.’
An intriguingly similar view had been expressed, well before Smith, by
Voltaire in his Lettres philosophiques (also known as Lettres anglaises): ’Il
est bien vrai que Dieu aurait pu faire des creatures uniquement attentives
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au bien d’autrui. Dans ce cas, les marchands auraient ete aux Indes par
charite et le macon eut scie de la pierre pour faire plaisir a` son prochain.
Mais Dieu a etabli les choses autrement....C’est par nos besoins mutuels que
nous sommes utiles au genre humain; c’est le fondement de tout commerce;
c’est l’eternel lien des hommes.’ (’Assuredly, God could have created be-
ings uniquely interested in the welfare of others. In that case, traders would
have been to India by charity, and the mason would saw stones to please
his neighbor. But God designed things otherwise...It is through our mutual
needs that we are useful to the human species; this is the grounding of every
trade; it is the eternal link between men.’)
The French term ’amour propre’ certainly sounds a lot better than ’self-
love’. Voltaire boldly claimed: ’Il est aussi impossible qu’une societe puisse
se former et subsister sans amour propre, qu’il serait impossible de faire des
enfants sans concupiscence, de songer a` se nourrir sans appetit, etc. C’est
l’amour de nous-meˆme qui assiste l’amour des autres.’ (’It is as impossible
that a society could emerge and subsist without self-love than that people
could produce children without lust, feed themselves without appetite, etc.
Love for oneself assists the love for others.’)
It is unknown whether Hobbes, during his time in Paris, ever met Pascal;
but Smith most certainly had associated with Voltaire.
2 Public Goods and Private Incentives
So much for philosophical views on selfishness. They vary. But economic
models make it clear that self-interested individuals will not act to achieve
their group interest, except when prodded by incentives directed selectively
towards individuals in the group, i.e. punishing exploiters or rewarding con-
tributors (Olson 1965, see also Hardin 1966, Henrich and Boyd 2001, Sig-
mund 2007). Self-love is not always beneficial: it needs help to escape
from the traps of social dilemmas. In this chapter, we investigate the role
of reputation to promote an ’enlightened self-interest’. The importance of
reputation as a kind of second (non-onetary) currency is well-established
in economics literature, of course. Here we present a treatment based on
evolutionary game dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, Nowak 2006).
If players simply imitate what is successful in the long run, with nothing
but self-interest in their mind, populations can evolve towards economically
beneficially behavior.
We analyze a few basic models, starting with two scenarios which at first
glance seem quite different, and which are well-known in behavioral game
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theory as Trust Game and Ultimatum Game (Kagel and Roth 1995, Camerer
2003, Fehr and Camerer 2006).
Both are one-shot, two-person games. In both, a coin toss first decides
who of the two players is the Proposer and who is the Responder. The Pro-
poser is then endowed with a certain amount of money. In the Trust Game
(Berg et al 1995), the Proposer can decide to donate part of this endowment
to the Responder, knowing that it will be multiplied by a factor r > 1 by
the experimenter. The Responder can then decide whether or not to return a
part of this donation to the Proposer. This concludes the Trust Game. The
Ultimatum Game (Gu¨th et al 1982) does not take much time either. The
endowment, in this case, is conditional. The Proposer has to offer a per-
centage p of it to the Responder, and if the Responder accepts, the Proposer
keeps the rest; but if the Responder declines, the experimenter withdraws
the whole sum, so that both players gain nothing.
In the Trust game, a purely selfish Responder will never return anything,
and a purely selfish Proposer, anticipating this, should offer nothing. In the
Ultimatum game, a Responder’s self-interest will accept any positive sum,
since it is better than nothing. Accordingly, the Proposer should offer only
a very small sum. In real experiments, the observed behavior differs con-
siderably from these predictions of what a card-board ’homo economicus’
ought to do. Indeed, in the Trust game, Responders often return a large
part of their gift, and in the Ultimatum game, Responders often reject offers
which they deem too small (Camerer 2003, Henrich 2006). Accordingly,
Proposers in both types of games tend to transfer substantial proportions of
their endowment, to both players’ mutual benefit.
Both Trust and Ultimatum games are used to study norms of behavior,
such as fairness and concern for one another. We shall study the evolutionary
dynamics of simplified versions of these games, and then apply these results
to address the issue of public goods with positive or negative incentives. Our
main claim is that the concern for one’s own reputation plays an essential
role in causing us to deviate from what is prescribed for ’homo economicus’,
and hence to turn to economically more profitable behavior.
3 The Mini-Trust game
In a minimal variant of the Trust game, we assume that the Proposer has
only to decide whether or not to donate a fixed amount c. Thus a Proposer
has the choice between two moves e1 (donate) and e2 (defect). A Responder
who receives a donation (i.e. the amount b = rc) has a choice between two
3
moves, namely to return a certain amount β or not: these two moves will
be denoted by f1 and f2. To make the game interesting, we will assume that
c < β < b. In this case, if both players cooperate, both can make a gain.
The payoff matrix is
f1 f2
e1 (β − c, b− β) (−c, b)
e2 (0, 0) (0, 0)
(1)
Since the players are with equal probability in the role of Proposer and Re-
sponder, they are involved in a symmetric game. There exist four strategies,
namely (a) the ’pro-social’ strategyG1 = e1f1 (donate, return); (b) the strat-
egyG2 = e2f1 (such a player does not donate, but returns a donation; (c) the
asocial strategy G3 = e2f2 (neither donate nor return); and finally (d) the
strategy G4 = e1f2 (such a player donates, but does not return). It is easy
to compute the expected payoff values. But before doing this, we interpo-
late two brief sections on the replicator dynamics of two-role, two-strategy
games (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988, Sigmund et al 2001), in order to make
this chapter self-contained.
4 The dynamics of two-role games
Let us consider a game with two roles I and II, and with two strategies for
each role, which we denote by ei and fj . The payoff matrix is
f1 f2
e1 (A, a) (B, b)
e2 (C, c) (D, d)
(2)
Let us assume that a coin toss decides which role to assign to which
player. The strategies for the resulting symmetric game will be denoted by
G1 = e1f1, G2 = e2f1, G3 = e2f2 and G4 = e1f2. The payoff for a player
using Gi against a player using Gj is given, up to the factor 1/2 which we
shall henceforth omit, by the (i, j)-entry of the matrix
M =


A+ a A+ c B + c B + a
C + a C + c D + c D + a
C + b C + d D + d D + b
A+ b A+ d B + d B + b

 . (3)
Let us assume that players tend to imitate successful individuals, and hence
occasionally switch from one strategy to another. They compare their aver-
age payoff with that of another player and adopt that player’s strategy with a
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probability proportional to the payoff difference, if it is positive (if not, they
do not switch). Since the payoffs depend on the state of the (well-mixed)
population, given by the frequencies xi(t) of the strategies Gi, this yields
an evolutionary dynamics in the state space S4 = {(x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ R
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+ :
x1 + ...+ x4 = 1}. It is given by the replicator equation
x˙1 = xi[(Mx)i − M¯ ], (4)
where M¯ = x1(Mx)1 + ... + x4(Mx)4 is the average payoff in the popu-
lation. Since the dynamics are unaffected if one modifies the payoff matrix
M by replacingmij bymij −m1j , we can use the matrix


0 0 0 0
R R S S
R+ r R+ s S + s S + r
r s s r

 . (5)
with R := C −A, r := b− a, S := D −B and s := d− c.
5 Staying in the saddle
We shall denote matrix (5) again byM . It has the property that
m1j +m3j = m2j +m4j (6)
for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Hence
(Mx)1 + (Mx)3 = (Mx)2 + (Mx)4 (7)
holds for all x. From this follows easily that the function V = x1x3/x2x4
satisfies
V˙ = V [(Mx)1 + (Mx)3 − (Mx)2 − (Mx)4] = 0 (8)
in the interior of S4, and hence the value of V remains unchanged along
every orbit.
Hence the interior of the state simplex S4 is foliated by the surfaces
WK := {x ∈ S4 : x1x3 = Kx2x4}, (9)
with 0 < K <∞. These are saddle-like surfaces which are spanned by the
quadrangle of edges G1G2, G2G3, G3G4 and G4G1 joining the vertices of
the simplex S4 (see Fig 1).
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Figure 1 should be
approximately here.
Figure 1: The state space S4 (a simplex with four corners Gi, i=1,2,3,4, corresponding to the
four strategies of a symmetrized two-roles, two-strategies game), and a saddle-like surface WK
spanned by the edges G1 → G2 → G3 → G4 → G1 (see text). The evolving states remain on
their initial surface WK . If there exist fixed points in the interior of the state space, they form a
line intersecting eachWK .
The orientation of the flow on the edges can easily be obtained from the
previous matrix. For instance, if R = 0, then the edge G1G2 consists of
fixed points. If R > 0, the flow along the edge points from G1 towards G2
(in the absence of the strategies G3 and G4, the strategy G2 dominates G1),
and conversely, if R < 0, the flow points from G2 to G1.
Generically, the parametersR,S, r and s are non-zero. This corresponds
to 16 orientations of the quadrangleG1G2G3G4, which by symmetry can be
reduced to 4 (see Fig 2). Fixed points in the interior of the simplex S4 must
satisfy (Mx)i = 0 for i = 2, 3, 4 (since (Mx)1 trivially vanishes). This
implies for S 6= R
x1 + x2 =
S
S −R
, (10)
and for s 6= r
x1 + x4 =
s
s− r
. (11)
Such solutions lie in the simplex if and only if RS < 0 and rs < 0, which
corresponds to the orientations (c) and (d) of the quadrangle spanning the
saddle-like surfacesWK . If this is the case, one obtains a line of fixed points
which intersects each WK in exactly one point (see Fig. 1). The solutions
can be written as
xi = mi + ξ (12)
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for i = 1, 3 and
xi = mi − ξ (13)
for i = 2, 4, with ξ as parameter and
m =
1
(S −R)(s− r)
(Ss,−Sr,−Rr,Rs) ∈W1. (14)
Figure 2: The four generic orientations of the quadrangles spanning the saddle-like surfaces.
The orientations depend on the signs of R,S, r and s (see text). In cases (c) and (d), there exists a
fixed point in the interior ofWK .
Figure 2 should be
approximately here.
6 Farewell to Trust
For the corresponding payoff matrix, we obtain R = c− β < 0, r = β > 0,
S = c > 0 and s = 0 (see Fig 3). If x3 = x4 = 0, i.e., if everyone
in the population is ready to return a donation, it is best to donate, i.e, G1
dominates G2. If x2 = x3 = 0, i.e., if donations can be taken for granted,
then it is best not to return it, i.e., G4 dominates G1. If x1 = x2 = 0, i.e., if
no one ever returns a donation, then G3 dominates G4, i.e., it is best not to
donate. Finally, if x1 = x4 = 0, i.e., if nobody ever donates, then it does not
matter whether one is willing to return a donation or not. In this case, the
state of the population is a fixed point. NeitherG2 norG3 has an advantage.
It is easy to see that the segment QG3, where
Q = (0,
c
β
,
β − c
β
, 0), (15)
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Figure 3 should be
approximately here.
Figure 3: Dynamics on a saddle-like surface for the Trust game (or for a Public Good game with
reward). The edge G1G4 consists of fixed points, the segment G1Q of stable fixed points which
are Nash equilibria.
consists of saturated fixed points, i.e., of Nash equilibria. Indeed, for x1 =
x4 = 0, both (Mx)1 (which is normalized to 0) and (Mx)4 are smaller than
the average payoff M¯ = (Mx)2 = (Mx)3 = c − βx2. The flow along the
edges leads from G2 to G1, from there to G4, and then to G3. All orbits in
the interior converge to the segment QG3 for t → +∞ and to the segment
QG2 for t→ −∞. Thus the population will, in the long run, consist only of
players who, as Proposers, never donate (and consequently, as Responders,
never return anything). From the economic viewpoint, the minimal version
of the Trust game does not take off: no donations, no paybacks.
7 Ultimate offers
We now turn to the Ultimatum game. It is simple enough, but we shall
simplify it even further (cf. Nowak, Page and Sigmund 2000), and assume
that the Proposer has only a choice between offering a high percentage h
(for instance, 45 percent) or a low percentage l (for instance 15 percent),
with 0 < l < h < 1. The Responder could, in principle, accept both offers,
one of them, or none. Again, we simplify by assuming that he has to choose
between two strategies only: the strategy denoted by h, which consists in
accepting the high offer only, or the strategy denoted by l, which consists in
accepting both possible offers.
In this reduced version of the Ultimatum game, the two strategies for role
I, namely e1 and e2, are given by the offers h and l; and the two strategies
f1 and f2 for role II will again denoted by h and l, for convenience; these
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strategies correspond now the Responder’s aspiration levels. The payoff
matrix is given by
f1 f2
e1 (1− h, h) (1− h, h)
e2 (0, 0) (1− l, l)
(16)
The strategy G1 corresponds to (h, h): high offers, and a high aspiration
level. Wemay term it as the fair strategy. By contrast,G3 = (l, l) epitomizes
the selfish strategy. It leads to the acceptance of any positive offer, and aims
to part with as little as possible. The strategy G2 = (l, h) is paradoxical: it
offers little, but insists on a high offer. G4, finally, makes a good offer, but
accepts a low offer. For want of a better term, we call it the mild strategy.
The payoff parameters are R = h − 1 < 0, r = 0, S = h − l > 0 and
s = l > 0. The selfish strategy is dominated by the mild strategy, which is
dominated by the paradoxical strategy, which in turn is dominated by the fair
strategy; but the mild and the fair strategies are equivalent, in the absence of
the other two strategies, one does as well as the other: all offers are fair, and
the average payoff is 1/2.
There exist no fixed points in the interior of S4. Indeed, whenever x2 >
0 or x3 > 0, we have (Mx)4 > (Mx)1 and hence both ratios x4/x1 and
x3/x2 are increasing. On each surface WK , the flow is as shown in Fig
4. On the edge x2 = x3 = 0, all points are fixed points. If x1 <
h−l
1−l
,
then both (Mx)2 and (Mx)3 are larger than M¯ . Let us denote by Q the
point (h−l
1−l
, 0, 0, 1−h
1−l
). Then the symmetric Nash equilibria of the game are
those on the segment G3Q, and the vertex G1. We note that on the edge
x2 = x4 = 0, there exists another fixed point P , with coordinates (h, 0, 1−
h, 0). In a population with selfish and fair players only, we have a bistable
competition. The fair strategy is risk-dominant (i.e., a population consisting
in equal numbers of selfish and fair players will see fair players win) if h <
1/2.
The orbits in the interior of S4 either converge to G3, or else to the
set of Nash equilibria, as shown in Fig 4. If we assume that random shocks
occasionally perturb the state of the population, we will expect that they lead
to neutral drift along the edge x2 = x3 = 0. As soon as x1 <
h−l
1−l
, a random
perturbation sending the state into intS4 will cause the fixation of G3. This
implies that eventually, the population consists of selfish players only. Thus
evolutionary game theory leads to the same prediction as classical game
theory; both are in contrast to experimental evidence.
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Figure 4 should be
approximately here.
Figure 4: Dynamics on a saddle-like surface for the Ultimatum game (and Public Good game
with punishment). The edgeG1G4 consists of fixed points, the segmentG1Q of stable fixed points
which are Nash equilibria.
8 Bifurcation through Reputation
So far, we have considered conditions of strict anonymity. Let us now as-
sume that with some (possibly small) probability, players may know their
co-player by reputation, and in particular may know about the offers pre-
viously accepted by that co-player. Let us furthermore assume that occa-
sionally, players offer less than they usually would, if they have reason to
believe that they can get away with it; more precisely, if they know that their
co-player has previously accepted low offers. The two assumptions seem
reasonable enough: they only require some information about other players
in the group, and a touch of opportunistic selfishness. In that case, accepting
a low offer can have the regrettable consequence that one is offered less, in
future games.
In order to analyze this situation, let us assume that µ > 0 is the prob-
ability that a ’fair’ (h, h) Proposer encountering a mild (h, l) Responder
knows that this player accepts a low offer, and consequently offers l instead
of h. This yields the payoff matrix
f1 f2
e1 (1− h, h) (1− h+ µ(h− l), h− µ(h− l))
e2 (0, 0) (1− l, l)
(17)
which differs from (1) in one position only, by the term µ(h − l) which
can be arbitrarily small. It can be viewed as a perturbation of the previous
game, due to the effect of reputation. The corresponding symmetrized game
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(5) is now given by R = h − 1, r = −µ(h − l), S = (h − l)(1 − µ)
and s = l. For µ < 1, we have R < 0, S > 0, s > 0 (as before) and
r > 0 (while we had r = 0 in the unperturbed case). This yields now a
generic case, corresponding to case (c) in Fig 2. There exists a line of fixed
points in the interior of the state space S4. Each of the surfaces WK (for
K > 0) intersects this line in a saddle point. For µ → 0, the point m, and
with it all interior fixed points, converge to the point Q on the edge G1G4.
The dynamics on each surface WK is bistable, the vertices e1 and e3 are
the attractors (see Fig 5). Hence, depending on the initial condition, the
population will either converge to the fair or to the selfish strategy.
9 Public Goods with Punishment
In a simple form of the Public Goods game, each of the N players partic-
ipating in the game has the possibility of contributing a fixed amount c to
the common pool. The experimenter multiplies each player’s contribution
by a factor r > 1, and divides the resulting amount equally among all other
N − 1 players participating in the game.
For N = 2, this is a Prisoner’s Dilemma game game: both players can
decide whether or not to send a donation b = rc to the other player, at a
cost c for themselves. The dominant solution is to defect. But let us now
introduce a second stage to this game, by allowing the players to punish
defectors. We shall assume that the sanction consists in imposing a fine of
size β. This fine is not collected by the punishing player. On the contrary,
the punisher has to pay a fee, which costs him an amount γ. The first stage
of the game offers scope for altruism (helping another player at a cost for
oneself), and the second stage scope for spite (harming the other player at
a cost for oneself). Obviously, in both stages, the dominating solution is to
avoid the cost. A selfish player should defect in the first stage, and refuse to
punish in the second stage.
If we assume that players can impose their fine conditionally, fining only
those who have failed to help them, the long-term outcome will be, as be-
fore, that no pro-social behavior emerges (see Sigmund, Hauert and Nowak
2001). Indeed, let us label with e1 those players who cooperate by sending
a donation to their co-player, and with e2 those who do not, i.e. who defect;
similarly, let f1 denote those who punish defectors, and f2 those who do not.
11
Figure 5 should be
approximately here.
Figure 5: Dynamics on a saddle-like surface for an Ultimatum game with reputation (or for a
Public Good game with reputation). The dynamics is bistable, the pro-social state G1 and the
asocial state G3 are attractors.
The payoff matrix is given by
f1 f2
e1 (−c, b) (−c, b)
e2 (−β,−γ) (0, 0)
(18)
Here, the first number in each entry is the payoff for the corresponding row
player, and the second number for the column player. We have used the
same notation, as for two-role games, although the situation is completely
symmetric: instead of being either in one role or in the other, a player is first
in one role and then in the other. Despite this difference, we can apply the
same method as before. Indeed, each strategy for this two-stage game must
specify what to do in the first stage, and what to do in the second. Hence,
it is given by a pair eifj (with i, j ∈ {1, 2}). As in section 3, we denote
the resulting four strategies with G1 = e1f1, G2 = e2f1, G3 = e2f2 and
G4 = e1f2. The strategy G1 corresponds to the ’pro-social’ behavior: to
give help, and to punish those who don’t. G3 is the selfish strategy which
avoids any costs: a player using it does not help the co-player, and expects
no help. G2 can again be viewed as paradoxical: a G2-player defects, but
punishes a co-player who defects. Finally, G4 can again be viewed as a
’mild’ strategy: a G4 player sends a donation to the co-player but does not
react if this is not reciprocated.
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10 Dynamics with reputation
We can follow the same approach as before, and obtain R = c − β, S = c,
r = 0 and s = γ. Again, the manifolds WK = {x ∈ S4 : x1x3 = Kx2x4
are invariant (for K > 0) and the dynamics is as in Fig 3. In fact, the
Ultimatummini-game can be viewed as a special case, with γ = l, β = 1−l,
and b = c = h−l. Intuitively, this simply means that in the Ultimatum game,
the donation consists of making the high offer instead of the low offer. The
benefit to the recipient (i.e. the Responder) h − l is equal to the cost to the
donor (i.e. the Proposer). The punishment consists of refusing the offer.
This costs the Responder l (the amount offered) and punishes the Proposer
by the amount 1− l, which is large if the offer is low.
The fixed points in WK are the corners Gi and the points on the edge
G1G4. G3 is a Nash equilibrium, G2 is not. A point x on the edge G1G4
is a Nash equilibrium whenever x1 ≥ c/β. Thus if c > β, G3 is the only
Nash equilibrium. This case is of little interest. From now on, we restrict our
attention to the case c < β: the fine costs more than the donation. We denote
the point (c/β, 0, 0, (β−c)/β)withQ and see that the closed segmentQG1
consists of Nash equilibria. In the long run, in spite of the segment of Nash
equilibria, random shocks will ultimately establish the asocial state G3.
Still following the parallel with the Ultimatum game, let us assume
that with a probability µ, cooperators (i.e. e1-players) defect against non-
punishers, i.e. f2-players. (Hence µ is the probability that (1) the f2-type
becomes known and (2) the e1-type decides to defect). The payoff matrix
becomes
f1 f2
e1 (−c, b) (−c(1− µ), b(1− µ))
e2 (−β,−γ) (0, 0)
(19)
We obtain R = (c − β) < 0, S = c(1 − µ) > 0, s = γ > 0 and r =
−bµ < 0. Thus the edge G1G4 consists no longer of fixed points, but of an
orbit converging to G1. The dynamics is as in Fig 5. On each saddle-like
surface WK , and therefore in the whole interior of the state space S4, the
dynamics is bistable, with attractors G1 and G3. Depending on the initial
condition, every orbit converges to one of these two attractors, namely the
asocial stateG3 (no contributions, no punishment) and the pro-social regime
G1 (cooperate, punish defectors).
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11 Revealing errors
The previous model is, in a certain sense, incomplete. Indeed, it essentially
depends on altering the dynamics on the edge G1G4 by introducing the
reputation effect. But on that edge, the population consists of two types only,
both contributing to the public good. How should players learn whether the
co-player is of type f1 or f2, i.e. willing to punish a defector, or not? Even if
each player plays many rounds of the game, no defection ever arises.
There are several ways to deal with this question. One possibility would
be to assume that players learn about their co-players’ propensity to punish
from other sources. It seems not unlikely that we can get a good idea about
the irascibility or meekness of our co-players by watching their interactions
with noisy children or their reactions to the daily news, rather than merely
from observing how they act in the donation game. But it is probably better
to complete the model without appealing to other interactions.
The simplest approach is to introduce the possibility of errors. Let us
assume that player play the game repeatedly, and that players intending to
donate will, with a certain probability ǫ, fail to implement their intention.
(This could be due to a mistake, or to a lack of resources.) In the absence of
reputation, this yields the following payoff structure:
f1 f2
e1 (−(1− ǫ)c− ǫβ, (1− ǫ)b− ǫγ) (−(1− ǫ)c, (1− ǫ)b)
e2 (−β,−γ) (0, 0)
(20)
Compared with the situation in the previous section, s remains unchanged,
whereas R and S are multiplied by (1 − ǫ), which does not affect the sign,
and hence conserves the dynamics on the corresponding edge. But r is now
equal to ǫγ, and hence positive. This means that on the edge G1G4, the
flow points towards G4: punishment is dominated. As a result, we obtain a
dynamics as in case (b) of Fig 2. All orbits in the interior of the simplex S4
converge to the vertex G3. The asocial type wins.
Now let us introduce reputation. For simplicity, we will assume that
players who know that their co-player is not of the punishing type never do-
nate. (It would suffice to assume that they defect with a small probability).
The parameter µ, then, is simply the probability to learn that the co-player
has, once in the past, failed to punish a defector. If we assume perfect infor-
mation, this reduces to the probability that the co-player has encountered a
defection. On the edge x2 = x3 = 0, all players are willing to donate, and a
defection occurs only by mistake. The probability that the co-player, in his
k previous rounds, never faced a mistaken defection is (1− ǫ)k. If the num-
14
ber of rounds is distributed geometrically, with a constant probability w < 1
for a further round, then wk(1− w) is the probability that the co-player has
experienced k rounds. This means that
µ =
wǫ
1− w(1− ǫ)
. (21)
If we assume that a player does not donate if he knows that he can get away
with it (or if he commits an error), this yields
f1 f2
e1 (−(1− ǫ)c− ǫβ, (1− ǫ)b− ǫγ) (−(1− ǫ)(1− µ)c, (1− ǫ)(1− µ)b)
e2 (−β,−γ) (0, 0)
(22)
We see that r = ǫγ − µ(1− ǫ)b is negative if
γ <
w(1− ǫ)b
1− w(1− ǫ)
, (23)
i.e., if the fee for punishing the defector is not too high.
Of course this can also be applied to the Ultimatum game. In that case,
r = ǫγ − µ(1− ǫ)b is negative if
l < w(1− ǫ)h, (24)
i.e. if the low offer is sufficiently smaller than the high offer.
12 Public Goods with rewards
Let us now consider a public good game (still withN = 2 players only), but
assume that the players have, in a second phase of the game, the option of
rewarding contributors. Thus we consider a positive rather than a negative
incentive. We shall assume that players who reward their donors have to pay
a cost γ, and that the rewarded player receives an amount β (if β = γ this is
simply a payback). We assume 0 < c < β and 0 < γ < b. If e1 and e2 are
the two options for the first stage (to contribute or not), and f1 and f2 for the
second stage (to reward donors or not), then the payoff structure is given by
f1 f2
e1 (β − c, b− γ) (−c, b)
e2 (0, 0) (0, 0)
. (25)
The minimal variant of the Trust game, introduced in section 3, can be
viewed as a special case (making the usual analogy between a two-role game
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and a two-stages game). There exist four strategies, namely (a) the ’pro-
social’ strategy G1 = e1f1 (donate, reward); (b) the strategy G2 = e2f1
(such a player does not donate, but rewards a donor); (c) the asocial strategy
G3 = e2f2 (which neither donates nor rewards); and finally (d) the strategy
G4 = e1f2 (such a player donates, but does not reward). For the correspond-
ing payoff matrix (5), we obtain R = c− β < 0, r = γ > 0, S = c > 0 and
s = 0 (see Fig 3). The outcome is exactly the same as for the trust game.
Thus the population will, in the long run, consist only of players who always
defect (and consequently never reward).
Let us now introduce reputation effects into the Public Goods game with
rewards. We shall assume that with a small likelihood µ, cooperators defect
if they know that the other player is not going to reward them, i.e. is of
type f2. (µ is the probability that (1) the f2-type becomes known and (2)
the e1-type decides to defect). Similarly, we denote by ν the likelihood
that defectors cooperate if they know that they will be rewarded. (ν is the
probability that (1) the f1-type becomes known and (2) the e2-type reacts
and donates). This yields the payoff matrix
f1 f2
e1 (β − c, b− γ) (−c(1− µ), b(1− µ))
e2 ((β − c)ν, (b− γ)ν) (0, 0)
(26)
NowR = (c−β)(1−ν) < 0, S = c(1−µ) > 0, r = γ−bµwhich is positive
if µ is small, and s = (γ − b)ν, which is negative. It is this last condition
that differs from the unperturbed system. The edgeG2G3 no longer consists
of fixed points. Instead, G3 is dominated by G2: if players can acquire a
reputation for rewarding donations, this can motivate co-players to donate.
The essential parameter, therefore, is ν.
Let us begin by assuming that µ is small, so that r is positive. For ν > 0,
the flow on the edgeG2G3 leads towardsG3, so that the frame spanning the
saddle-like surfaces WK is cyclically oriented (see Fig 6). As before, there
exists now a line of fixed points in the interior of S4. On each saddle-like
surface WK , the orbits rotate around this fixed point; they spiral towards it
for 0 < K < 1 and away from it for K > 1. The surface W1 consists of
periodic orbits.
We stress the highly unpredictable dynamics if ν > 0 and µ small. For
one half of the initial conditions, the replicator dynamics sends the state to-
wards the line of fixed points. But there, random fluctuations will eventually
lead to the other half of the simplex, where the replicator dynamics leads to
the heteroclinic cycle G1G4G3G2. The population seems glued for a long
time to one strategy, then suddenly switches to the next, remains there for
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a still longer time etc... However, an arbitrarily small random shock will
send the state back into the half-simplex where the state converges again
to the line of fixed points, etc. Not even the time averages of the frequen-
cies of strategies converge. One can only say that the most probable state
of the population is either monomorphic (i.e. close to one corner of S4)
or else close to the attracting part of the line of fixed points (all four types
present, the proportion of cooperators larger among rewarders than among
non-rewarders, and – if the values ν is small – a frequency of rewarders close
to c/β, and a frequency of donors which is small).
Figure 6 should be
approximately here.
Figure 6: Dynamics on a saddle-like surface for the Trust game with reputation (µ small, ν > 0).
The edges are cyclically oriented. For W1, the orbits are periodic. The orbits on WK converge
either to the inner fixed point or to the boundary, depending on whether 0 < K < 1 orK > 1.
Let us note that we encounter the same problem as for the Public Good
with Punishment. If x1 = x4 = 0, then nobody ever donates. In this case,
how should the f1-trait (rewarding donors) ever reveal itself? The assump-
tion that occasionally players commit errors is far less plausible as in the
previous case, since donating inadvertently is far less likely than failing in
the intention to donate.
Finally, let us briefly consider the case when the fact that a player does
not reward has a high probability to become publicly known. In that case, it
is unlikely that such a player receives a donation. This means that µ is close
to 1, and hence that the parameter r = γ − bµ is negative. In that case, all
orbits in the saddle-like surfaceWK converge to G1 (see Fig. 7): the social
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strategy wins.
Figure 7: Dynamics on the saddle-like surface for the Trust game if µ > β/b. In
that case, all orbits converge to G1.
Figure 7 should be
approximately here.
13 Larger groups
So far we have only considered games with two players. Many economic
interactions, and in particular many joint enterprises, involve more than two
actors. In section 9 we have introduced a so-called others only version of the
Public Good game with N players. Each player’s contribution is multiplied
by r > 1 and divided equally among allN −1 other players. In another ver-
sion, we can assume that it is divided among allN players, so that if a player
contributes c, then a part r
N
is returned to the donor. In the simplest case,
when each contribution is of the same value c and if Nc players contribute,
then the total amount cNc is multiplied by r > 1 and divided equally among
all N participants. A social dilemma holds if r < N . In alternative models,
the total amount is a non-linear function of the number of contributors.
Similarly, there are many ways of modeling punishment. In the sim-
plest approach, each punisher pays a fee γ to inflict a fine β upon each
defector. The resulting game dynamics is like that with two players (Hauert
et al 2004). If random shocks occasionally perturb the system, then in the
long run, the asocial strategy (no contribution, no punishment) dominates the
population. Again, the situation can be redressed if we assume that players
can obtain information about the type of their co-players, and that contribu-
tors occasionally yield to the temptation of exploiting their co-players if they
know that they can get away with it (i.e., that there are few or no punishers
in their group).
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With positive rewards, the situation is again similar to that of a two-
person game, at least for a large set of paramter values.
14 Discussion
It is unlikely that one-shot interactions between anonymous players, such
as the Ultimatum game or the Trust game, play a prominent role in human
economy. In fact, their artificiality is an advantage for experiments. From
early on, most experiments in physics or physiology are similarly based on
artificial situations, such as a feather in a vacuum tube etc.
On the other hand, some everyday parallels to Trust and Ultimatum
games exist. For instance, sellers who fix a (non-negotiable) price tag to an
object displayed in their shopwindow are proposing an offer to the passersby,
who can reject it or not. This has similarities with the Ultimatum game. And
individuals entrusting their banker with money are engaging in a transaction
similar to a Trust game. In everyday life, we often see that contributions to
the public good are encouraged by heavily fining free-riders, etc (Henrich
2006, Ostrom and Walker 2003). On the other hand, there are essential dif-
ferences between the games and the real-life parallels. For instance, many
passersby will look into the shopwindow, whereas the Ultimatum game has
only one Responder (if there are several, the outcome is drastically altered).
In each of these games, reputation can play an essential role in boosting
the economically advantageous strategy (just as in indirect reciprocity, see
(Nowak and Sigmund 2005, Wedekind and Milinski 2000). Reputation re-
quires an information flow in the population. This information flow extends
the knowledge obtained through the games that are personally experienced
by a player, and usually relies on gossip. For instance, we have seen in sec-
tion 12 that as soon as it is safe to assume that a funds manager who returns
less than the investment becomes publicly known, the social strategy (for the
clients, to invest, and for the managers, to return more than that investment
to the clients) is a global attractor. Another example concerns internet trad-
ing, such as e-Bay. It relies heavily on the possibility that clients can rate
their former partners. Another argument stems from psychology. If individ-
uals feel unfairly treated, they often vent their emotions to a large audience
(see e.g. Xiao and Houser 2005). Anger is loud. The logic behind this is
clear: rejecting an unfair but positive offer involves costs, which can only be
recouped if they prevent others from making unfair offers. If you take the
trouble of getting emotional, you should make it known.
The importance of information has been displayed in a neat experiment
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based on two treatments of the Ultimatum game (Fehr and Fischbacher
2003). Each player engages in several such games (always against a dif-
ferent partner, of course). In one treatment, players are anonymous. In the
other treatment, players have pseudonyms and know that their decisions,
as Responder, will be made known to their future Proposers. Aspiration
levels are significantly higher in the second treatment. Players are more
likely to reject offers. They seem to expect that if they once accept a low
offer, they run a high risk of encountering such offers again and again.
(See also http://homepage.univie.ac.at/hannelore.brandt/ultimatum/ for on-
line computer simulations, cf. Figs 8 a and b).
Figure 8: Two variants of individual-based simulations on the Ultimatum game.
In both cases, 1000 fictitious players with randomly chosen strategies (p, q) (where
p is the size of the offer and q the aspiration level) each play 50 games against
randomly chosen co-players. Then, the frequencies of the strategies are updated
according to the replicator dynamics. This is repeated for many ’generations’. Left:
players are anonymous. The population average of the (p, q)-values starts out close
to the center (p and q close to 50 percent). After a drop in the p-value, the population
average converges back to the diagonal and then inches along the diagonal towards
(0, 0). Right: players know the past of their co-players, and offer the minimum
of their own p-value and the offers previously accepted by their co-player. The
evolution begins similarly. But then, when the population average has returned to
the diagonal, the p and q-values creep up, not down, and reach a value slightly
below 50 percent.
Figure 8 should be
approximately here.
Of course, even if players know perfectly well that their action is not
observed, they often act as if it were. The lingering suspicion that despite
double-blind conditions etc. someone could be watching, is neatly captured
in a series of experimental papers that show that the mere picture of an eye
(on a poster, or on a computer screen) can activate a subconscious concern
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for the own reputation (Haley and Fessler 2005, Bateson et al 2006, Burn-
ham and Hare 2007).
But the emergence of pro-social behavior not only requires information,
it also requires a certain amount of selfishness (or ’self-love’, to use a kinder
but old-fashioned term). Without selfishness, incentives would not work. In
the public good games with punishment, for instance, players must not only
acquire knowledge about who is a punisher and who not, they must also be
prone to defect if they know that they can get away with it. This is a finding
well in the spirit of Voltaire’s statement that ’it is impossible that a society
can emerge and subsist without self-love’.
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